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On March 23, 2010 President Obama signed legislation which aims to
provide insurance to the nearly 17 percent of Americans who lack coverage and
overhaul the nation’s healthcare system. This came on the heels of a year rife with
bipartisan debate and several past presidencies which strove, though ultimately
failed, to make such a provision. In the end, the bill did not receive a single
Republican vote inevitably setting the stage for years of bitter disagreement and
much political foot-dragging. Already the law has been subject to votes for repeal in
Congress and judicial challenges around the country (NY Times, 2011).
Several problems in the United States healthcare system make reform
desirable. 2010 census data indicates there are 50 million Americans without
coverage and that that number is rising (MSNBC, 2010). Those who are covered
apparently pay too much in exchange for too little. In terms of overall quality of
healthcare the World Health Organization ranked the United States 37th in a wellknown 2000 study (WHO, 2000). Though other organizations have argued that the
WHO utilized a biased method of comparison this ranking nevertheless came as a
shock to a nation which prides itself on being a world leader. Another study by the
RAND Corporation concluded that U.S. healthcare spending as a percentage of GDP
has been rising steadily for the past 40 years and, without intervention, will
continue to do so into the foreseeable future. Further data from this study shows a
high degree of correlation between GDP per capita and healthcare spending per
capita in developed countries. In this data the United States is a clear outlier
meaning it spends much more on healthcare per capita compared to GDP per capita
(RAND Corporation, 2005).
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The Obama administration’s Patient Protection and Affordable Healthcare
Act aims to expand access to healthcare while improving overall quality and
reducing costs. The law offers reforms over the ways in which insurance providers
historically have conducted themselves. Pre-existing conditions can no longer be
used as grounds for denying coverage, rescinding coverage, or raising premiums. In
addition, the law extends coverage to those who previously could not afford it.
Preventive care is now free for all. Seniors and those up to 133% above the poverty
level receive additional coverage from an expansion in both Medicare and Medicaid
(Healthcare.gov, 2010). Those who do not qualify for either social program are
benefitted through the establishment of health insurance exchanges. Such
marketplaces for health insurance are available to individuals and businesses and
will serve to drive down prices for coverage through competition. Federal credits
will also be made available based on income for use in the exchange (House
Committee on Ways and Means, 2009). If successful, the PPACA should make
healthcare available to all U.S. citizens and reform certain features of the U.S.
healthcare and insurance systems which seem unjust and unfair.
The question of universal healthcare is so divisive because of the complexity
it involves and the far reaching effects which it promises. For many the issue rests
not only on political affiliation but deeply held ideological beliefs. I have written my
thesis with this animosity in mind. At the same time it has been my goal from the
start to look at the healthcare debate from a fresh angle. Instead of focusing on the
political discourse I have taken an approach seated in ethics and political
philosophy. My central task is to discover what relationship exists between
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universal healthcare and justice. It is only after finding some appropriate account of
justice that the U.S. healthcare reform can be evaluated from an ethical standpoint.
In order to answer this question I delve into the work of contemporary
political philosopher John Rawls. His book A Theory of Justice is the preeminent
voice in the current conversation on justice. From here I have borrowed Rawls’
justice as fairness account, in which he imagines a hypothetical situation similar to
the state of nature. These individuals in the original position exist behind what he
calls the veil of ignorance; they have no knowledge of what their endowments, social
status, or idea of the good will be in reality. Any guiding principles of justice which
they agree to in this situation are thereby just. Utilizing his conception of justice I
explore what status universal healthcare should have. As it seems individuals in the
original position would assent to principles of justice that guarantee access to
healthcare I conclude that universal healthcare is necessary for justice. Therefore as
a society we are morally obligated to provide universal access to healthcare.
Martha Nussbaum offers an alternative conception of justice which I also
consider. The capabilities approach is founded on the idea that there are certain
inalienable facets of human life that everyone should have access to. Some examples
include living a life of normal length, bodily integrity, and the choice to participate in
the various facets of society. It seems that justice is violated when one is denied
access to any of these capabilities. Lack of healthcare seems to prevent the normal
human functioning necessary for many of these experiences and therefore universal
healthcare is necessary for justice. While I find this approach to have merit it is also
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problematic. I raise several objections for the capabilities approach and affirm that
Justice as fairness is the better choice.
I defend my chosen account of justice against a series of objections. One
problem which I explore is the distinction between therapy and enhancement. No
coherent system of healthcare can exist which does not delineate these two
categories of care. Traditionally we might think of dialysis as being an example of
therapy and associate enhancement with something like cosmetic surgery. It seems
from the perspective of the original position that therapy would be covered under
universal healthcare and enhancement would not. The line, however, becomes
blurred as problem cases are examined. I discuss various definitions of health and
disease in an effort to make the distinction clearer. In the end I attempt to offer
some pragmatic directions on this issue though I also point out that this problem is
not specific to my project and that any examination of healthcare will face similar
difficulties.
Robert Nozick’s work of libertarian political philosophy Anarchy, State, and
Utopia offers the most difficult objections to my view. The second section of his book
serves as a direct answer to the work of John Rawls. While Rawls argues for
distributive justice, Nozick counters that the minimalist state is the largest which
can be justified. To this end Nozick offers arguments both against a distributive
state, the famous Wilt Chamberlain example, and against Rawls’ critical principle of
justice, the difference principle. While Nozick raises many additional objections I
have attempted here to answer those which are most damaging to my particular
thesis.
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The final section is an exploration of the various healthcare systems in use
around the world. I attempt to broadly categorize these systems and look at those
which have had the greatest success. Consideration is also given to which, if any,
systems are favored by justice as fairness.
In the conclusion I revisit the Patient Protection and Affordable Healthcare
Act. Armed with Rawls’ account of justice I evaluate whether or not the Obama
administration’s reform efforts are sufficient. As I have determined that a certain
level of access to healthcare for all is necessary for justice, the law must make this
provision or we must accept that United States society remains unjust.
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Chapter 1: Rawls’ Account of Justice
1.1: Justice as Fairness
Healthcare is a commodity that concerns and affects all people. It can be
observed that access to healthcare differs the world over. Some societies require
that it be available to all while in others it is only accessible to those who can afford
it. Nearly all societies strive for justice. The achievement of a just society is one of
the highest human goals. As a whole we strive to act in an ethical manner whenever
possible. Whether healthcare is necessary for a society to be considered just is an
open question. It can only be answered in the framework of some coherent account
of justice.
A widely supported conception of justice is given by John Rawls in A Theory
of Justice. I will use this as a starting point from which I will argue that universal
access to healthcare is necessary for justice. It follows that all societies have a moral
obligation to provide healthcare. All people have an interest in achieving and
maintaining good health. Everyone has a personal conception of the good life and
strives to achieve it. Healthcare helps maintain the level of human function which is
necessary in this pursuit. Though healthcare is extremely valuable it can be cost
prohibitive for some. Following the Rawlsian tradition I will argue that individuals
unaware of their own situation in reality would assent to guiding principles that
require universal access to healthcare
Justice as fairness is the conception of justice presented by John Rawls in A
Theory of Justice. His account follows the contractarian tradition of Locke, Rousseau,
and Kant with one major difference: the focus of Rawls’ project is not a contract for
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some particular government but the principles of justice that underlie a just society.
Rawls offers justice as fairness as an alternative to utilitarianism, the dominant
theory of right action. He finds such an account susceptible to strong objections and
proposes justice as fairness as an alternative (Rawls, xviii).
By choosing to come together as a society certain social benefits become
available which otherwise would not exist. Principles of justice determine the
division of social benefits and assign basic rights and duties (Rawls, 10). They are
necessarily fair when chosen in the original position, a hypothetical situation prior
to social cooperation. Individuals in the original position are behind what Rawls
calls the veil of ignorance; they have no knowledge of what social status,
distribution of natural assets and abilities, and conception of the good they will have
in reality. This is in order to prevent anyone from attempting to tailor principles of
justice to his or her own benefit. By choosing behind the veil of ignorance
individuals must consider what principles of justice they would want regardless of
how well they are endowed in reality (Rawls, 11). Rawls assumes they are free,
rational, and mutually disinterested in one another. As a result each individual will
attempt to craft principles which give him or herself the greatest personal share of
social benefits. The original position is of course a purely hypothetical situation and
not meant to represent any historical event. However, Rawls’ approach gives us a
mechanism by which to determine whether a given society is just. If the society is
built upon principles of justice which its members would assent to in the original
position then it is just. If they would choose differently in the original position the
principles of justice are unfair and the society is unjust (Rawls, 12). In A Theory of
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Justice Rawls proposes two principles which he believes free and rational people in
the original position would accept, the principle of equality and the difference
principle.
In the original position, individuals would not be inclined to choose a
principle of utility such that society is arranged, “to achieve the greatest net balance
of satisfaction summed over all individuals belonging to it” (Rawls, 20). The
consequence of such an arrangement is that some have less so that others may have
more. Those in the original position see themselves as equals. Agreeing to a
principle of justice which aims to maximize the net sum of happiness would be
unlikely for individuals who hold this belief. In addition, each person in Rawls’
hypothetical situation is rational and self-interested. They will assent only to
principles which protect their capacity to advance their conception of the good. One
would not expect them to waive their own interests in order to achieve the greatest
net satisfaction (Rawls, 13).
Rawls proposes two radically different principles of justice, the principle of
equality and the difference principle. The first requires equality in the assignment of
rights and duties for all people. The second, the difference principle, breaks into two
basic parts. The first holds that social and economic inequalities are just only when
they result in compensating benefits for all and especially for those members of
society who are least advantaged. One may notice that this principle is directly
opposed to the principle of utility as it strictly prohibits some from having less so
that others may have more. However, it is not unjust that some distinguish
themselves in the social and economic realms so long as the situation of those less
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advantaged is improved (Rawls, 13). The second part of Rawls’ difference principle
is often referred to as the principle of fair equality of opportunity. It states, “Social
and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are…attached to offices
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls,
72). There is nothing unfair about some jobs providing better compensation than
others so long as they are open to all people of equal natural ability and the
inequality in payment is to everyone’s benefit. Rawls’ adoption of the difference
principle is based on the intuitive idea that the benefits of social cooperation depend
upon the participation of all people, including those who are less well endowed.
Therefore, a principle which proposes cooperation on fair terms such as the
difference principle is necessary (Rawls, 13).

1.2: Universal Healthcare and the Original Position
If one accepts Rawls’ conception of justice a moral obligation to provide
universal healthcare necessarily follows. Any society which does not make such a
provision is unjust. In order to support this claim I will argue that individuals in the
original position would assent to various principles of justice which require
universal access to healthcare.
Individuals in the original position are situated behind the veil of ignorance.
This hypothetical arrangement prevents them from knowing their actual state of
affairs in reality as determined by the natural and social lotteries. Some are well
endowed while others, poorly endowed, are destined to suffer. None can be said to
deserve their allotment; the outcomes of the natural and social lotteries are neutral
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with respect to justice. The situation which one is born into is the result of these
lotteries.
Both health and wealth are relevant to the topic of healthcare and the two
are often interconnected. I take wealth to include monetary resources available to
an individual in some capacity, generally through familial relationships. Wealth can
be deployed in an effort to achieve good health through preventive, therapeutic, and
palliative care. Health is the outcome of one’s inherited genetic makeup, novel
genetic mutations, and the external situation one is born into. Some are born with
favorable genetics into wealth and a good environment. Their continuing health is
not ensured but they rest easier knowing that any necessary healthcare can be
provided for. Some are born less fortunate, unhealthy but with the necessary
resources to afford treatment. Though they are more likely to need healthcare in
order to maintain good health they can at least buy the necessary care. Those born
into limited wealth are less likely to maintain good health no matter what situation
they are born into. Most people, regardless of genetics and external factors, need
healthcare at some point in their lives. Without access to treatment their good
health cannot be ensured.
Good health is fundamental in most conceptions of the good life. Health
allows one to live a life that coincides with a normal human life span. However, this
is not the only reason why health is important. Good health is generally necessary in
order to participate in activities and be the subject of experiences. As Norman
Daniels argues it is not the notion that good health is important for happiness that
makes healthcare a special need but the importance of good health in opportunity
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(Daniels, 387). A lack of health limits one’s function precluding the activities and
experiences which are vital to the human experience. Healthcare is the best means
by which to correct and prevent ill health. Though our treatments are not perfect in
restoring health they are often effective in bringing back some degree of function, if
only temporarily. Healthcare includes three categories of medical intervention:
preventive, therapeutic, and palliative. None of the three is essential for all people;
there are certainly individuals who never receive any sort of treatment and are of
good health for the length of a normal human lifespan. Most, however, will
experience all types of care to some extent. Preventive care can be as simple as
education in healthful living, therapeutic care could just be setting a broken bone,
and palliative care includes the administration of painkillers as basic as aspirin.
Additionally, each category can be extended to include the most advanced
procedures available. Most individuals will experience the need for a level of care
between these two extremes dependent upon their allotment in the natural lottery.
As a consequence of the social lottery, however, they may not be able to afford the
necessary healthcare.

1.3: The Indirect Approach
Rational and self-concerned individuals in the original position would choose
principles of justice which ensure a right to healthcare. Behind the veil of ignorance
they have no knowledge of their actual situation but assent to principles of justice
which should provide the greatest share of social benefits regardless of their real
endowments. Given the importance of healthcare and the possibility of not being

14

able to afford it I believe individuals in the original position would assent to
principles of justice which necessitate this provision. The first part of Rawls’
difference principle necessitates universal healthcare and would be chosen in the
original position. I refer to this strategy as the indirect approach. It is so named
because it involves individuals in the original position assenting to a principle of
justice that does not specifically call for universal healthcare but has it as a
consequence when applied. By agreeing to a broad principle of justice such as the
difference principle those in the original position are implicitly assenting to the
multiple specific principles which result, one of which is universal healthcare.
Individuals who in reality are best endowed will use their natural talents to
flourish. Others, being less advantaged, will not have the same degree of success. As
some prosper and others struggle social and economic inequality results. The first
part of the difference principle holds that such disparity is morally permissible
provided it results in compensating benefits for all members of society, especially
those who are least advantaged. Social cooperation requires the participation of
everyone, the advantaged and disadvantaged alike. Without those who are worse off
in reality those with useful talents would not have the chance to flourish within the
construct of social cooperation. The better advantaged provide compensating
benefits to those who are less well situated in order to attract their participation.
Advantaged persons in the framework of social cooperation should have
little difficulty securing healthcare for themselves. If not born into wealth they could
at least parlay their talents into the funds necessary for care. Individuals poorly
endowed in reality, however, have little hope of obtaining healthcare. Blinded by the
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veil of ignorance those in the original position would assent to principles of justice
which ensure access to healthcare in the event that they are in actuality poorly
endowed. The difference principle provides the means to make this provision as it
sets aside compensating benefits for these individuals. One could imagine this
coming in the form of taxes levied against those who have used their talents to
create exceptional personal wealth. Their opportunity to succeed is partially
dependent upon the less well off and therefore they must offer compensation.
Individuals in the original position would agree to a stipulation that compensating
benefits are put towards healthcare.
It seems a society could exist that conforms to the difference principle but
does not have universal healthcare. Compensating benefits could be redistributed to
less advantaged citizens and they could use them for healthcare or however they
saw fit. This would not violate the difference principle yet universal healthcare
would not arise. Though this seems plausible it is not what rational people in the
original position would choose. Knowing the value of health and not knowing what
their actual situation would be like they would agree to the stipulation that a
sufficient portion of their compensating benefits be put towards healthcare. Though
this limits their freedom it guarantees that their health will be provided for no
matter what. Behind the veil of ignorance no one knows what sort of rationality he
or she will actually exhibit in reality. The stipulation for healthcare hedges against
contingencies in which the individual is influenced to use his or her compensating
benefits inappropriately. For instance one could be heavily addicted to a costly and
deleterious practice such as drug use or gambling. In such a situation the individual
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would sacrifice health in order to placate addiction. In another case one could be
mentally disabled and as a result be unable to make the decision for care to alleviate
suffering. Rational individuals in the original position would choose for their
compensating benefits to fund universal healthcare for the fear that they may lack
this good sense later.

1.4: Daniels’ Argument for Universal Healthcare
The standard by which any account of justice in healthcare is measured is
Norman Daniels’ Justice, Health, and Healthcare. In his classic essay Daniels adopts
an indirect approach similar to my own arguing from Rawls’ justice as fairness. He
begins by outlining three central questions which any account should answer: why
is healthcare special, when are inequalities in health unjust, and how can we meet
healthcare needs under resource constraints (Daniels, 386)? I will mainly focus on
Daniels’ response to questions one and two.
Daniels finds the force of healthcare in protecting opportunity. Healthcare
helps safeguard normal human functioning allowing individuals to participate in
political, social, and economic life in their society. Each individual has a personal
view of the good life which includes a certain range of function reasonable for their
given society. Healthcare, as well as other social welfare programs, allows for them
to live according to this plan (Daniels, 387). My view matches Daniels’ in this regard.
We both see the necessity of good health in opportunity. As I have argued,
healthcare is the means by which good health is achieved and thus it is of central
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importance in protecting opportunity. Daniels’ view and my own share additional
pieces in common but differ in important ways.
According to Daniels, socioeconomic situation and health are inextricably
linked. He provides empirical evidence to support his claim that, “inequality is
strongly associated with population mortality and life expectancy across
nations…wealthier countries with more equal income distributions, such as Sweden
and Japan, have higher life expectancies” (Daniels, 389). Inequality in all forms, not
just access to healthcare, correlates with poorer health. The best way to improve
health then is to limit inequality in a given society. In order to do so Daniels appeals
to the second part of Rawls’ difference principle. The principle of fair equality of
opportunity holds that positions and offices should be open to all and awarded on
merit. Wrapped in this proposition is the notion that all should have an equal
opportunity to acquire the skills upon which merit is based (Rawls, 72). This flattens
the socioeconomic gradient in two respects: it assures equal basic liberties such as
access to public education, childcare, and healthcare and it only permits inequalities
in income when the inequalities work to advance the position of the least
advantaged (Daniels, 390).
Norman Daniels and I both utilize the difference principle in our indirect
approaches to universal healthcare. While I appeal to the first part he utilizes the
second which is often referred to as the principle of fair equality of opportunity.
Daniels settles on this approach though I will not. Instead of choosing to route my
argument through the difference principle, an arrangement which is fundamentally
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indirect, I will argue the merits of a direct approach over my proposed indirect
approach and Daniels’.

1. 5 The Direct Approach
The difference principle, in conjunction with the justice as fairness,
necessitates the provision of universal healthcare. Those in Rawls’ original position
would assent to this principle of justice as a hedge against being poorly endowed in
reality. However, this is not the only principle of justice which would be reasonable
for one to accept in the original position. Here I will present the direct approach as
an alternative to the indirect approaches which both Norman Daniels and I have
previously argued for.
Those in the original position would find the direct approach to universal
healthcare appealing for familiar reasons. They would value health and wish to live
in a society which provides healthcare as their situation in reality may be
unfortunate. The direct approach is similar to the indirect approach in that it leads
to the provision of universal healthcare from a principle of justice agreed upon in
the original position. The major difference is the selection of a single, narrow
principle of justice rather than one which is broader such as the difference principle.
By selecting the difference principle those in the original position agree to calling
just whatever follows from it. Daniels and I have both argued that universal
healthcare, among other social programs, comes about in this way. The direct
approach is more specific. Given the situation of these individuals they would agree
to a principle of universal healthcare in the same way that they would agree to the
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difference principle. They may assent to other specific principles of justice like a
principle of public education or principle of subsidized nourishment though these
social programs would obviously not be covered under the principle of universal
healthcare.
A principle of universal healthcare would require the provision of healthcare
in a manner identical to the difference principle. The way to discover what such a
principle would entail is to imagine what sort of system of universal healthcare
rational individuals would assent to behind the veil of ignorance. The amount and
types of care necessary for justice are whatever those in the original position would
assent to. It seems reasonable to assume that such a principle of justice would
ensure at least minimally decent healthcare to all members of a given society at no
cost to them. Deciding upon a definition for minimally decent healthcare is a project
within itself and one which I will not pursue at this time. Such a definition, however,
would undoubtedly draw on the idea that minimally decent health is the level of
function necessary to achieve one’s expected range of opportunities. Individuals in
the original position would also likely choose to make provisions for preventive,
therapeutic, and palliative care. With all types of care, especially that which comes at
the end of one’s life, it is important to have some mechanism of rationing in place. In
the most general terms such a mechanism would assign the resources of healthcare
based upon cost and expected outcome. These pieces make a basic system of
universal healthcare set out by a principle of universal healthcare.
The extent of care necessary for justice is also context dependent. The care
one can expect to receive now differs from what was available ten years ago and
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what will be available ten years in the future. Healthcare is extremely technology
dependent and the interventions which should be available to all people would
reflect this. As the available procedures and resources change so do the associated
costs. The given system of universal healthcare must constantly evolve for this
reason. It is unwise then to set in stone any system of healthcare arrived at in the
original position. Though many of its features will endure it must be dynamic in
order to reflect the evolution of medicine. It should also be noted that any system of
universal healthcare will be influenced by the society and culture in which it is put
in place. A poorer society cannot be expected to provide expensive, cutting edge
procedures in the way that a richer one can. This undoubtedly affects the minimum
level of care necessary for justice and the mechanism of rationing in place. These
stipulations would be included in the principle of universal healthcare.
One should favor the direct approach over both the indirect approach from
the first part of the difference principle that I have laid out and the indirect
approach from fair equality of opportunity put forth by Norman Daniels. All the
given approaches lead to universal healthcare. The route which they take, however,
differs. The direct approach involves those in the original position accepting a
principle which ensures access to universal healthcare. Under the indirect approach
individuals in the original position submit to the difference principle. This principle
of justice, given what it entails, makes it unjust for the given society to omit
universal access to care. Accepting the difference principle leads to the principle of
universal healthcare, among other specific principles of justice. The indirect
approach leads to the same place as the direct but in one extra step and with no
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added advantage. By accepting the difference principle one implicitly accepts all
specific principles of justice which come from it. Assuming consistency from those in
the original position, the specific principles which come out of the difference
principle should be identical to the specific principles that would be directly chosen.
Given the nature of the two approaches, however, the direct route seems favorable.
Both achieve the same end yet the indirect approach adds unnecessary complexity.
In the interest of efficiency the direct approach is the better choice.
In one sense the direct approach is actually more complex than the indirect.
Under the indirect approach only one principle is required in order to determine all
features of the society required by justice. The direct approach instead requires
many principles of justice as each is highly specific like the principle of universal
healthcare. By assenting to many principles instead of just one the direct approach
adds complexity. While this is true it only adds complexity in one sense and in
another more important sense reduces it. The difference principle itself is extremely
complex. In formulating it Rawls sought to craft a principle if justice which could
give rise to all others. It is intentionally broad and vague leading to its great
complexity. The principle of universal healthcare and the other like it are conversely
simple. Each gives rise to one thing and the complete nature of each is immediately
obvious. While assenting to many principles is more complex than accepting the
difference principle each specific principle is far simpler.
From a practical standpoint the direct approach is additionally advantageous.
The difference principle states that inequality is permissible so long as it raises the
level of the least advantaged members of society. In addition, there may be social
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and economic positions which are better than others provided they are open to all.
Norman Daniels and I have argued that if one accepts the difference principle then
provisions must be made in society for universal healthcare and other social welfare
programs. This is so because specific principles of justice like the principle of
universal healthcare come out of the difference principle. In doing abstract political
philosophy it is easy to say that various social programs emerge from this principle
of justice. In practice, however, it would be extremely difficult to enumerate which
specific principles emerge and their distinct features. Unlike the original position
healthcare is not just an abstract tool. Instead it is a real and important system
which affects all people the world over. It seems reasonable that knowing this those
in the original position would select the direct approach. In doing so they assent to a
principle which guarantees access to healthcare. There is no room for interpretation
as there is with the difference principle.
In her essay “Universal Access to Healthcare” Lesley Jacobs examines
whether an egalitarian such as Daniels or myself can justify universal care.
Specifically she deals with Daniels’ argument for universal healthcare which she
refers to as “the minimalist egalitarian strategy” (Jacobs, 333). In this approach
Daniels argues for universal access to care on the grounds that it is a requirement of
fair equality of opportunity. Also known as the second part of the difference
principle, fair equality of opportunity was introduced by John Rawls as an
alternative to formal equality of opportunity. Rawls considered the former to be an
improvement on the latter in one important sense. Formal equality of opportunity
holds that individuals with equal talents and motivations must have equal legal
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access to advantaged social positions. Rawls recognizes that this view is incomplete
without taking into account the different socioeconomic starting points which
individuals come from. This uneven footing is the reason that people of similar merit
do not reach the same advantaged positions even though everyone has equal legal
access. Fair equality of opportunity seeks to remedy this problem as it holds that
people of equal merit should have equal prospects of success regardless of
socioeconomic position. To this end Rawls argues everyone must have access to a
system of education that serves to minimize the effects of one's socioeconomic class
on ambitions and natural talents. The desired effect is a flattening of the
socioeconomic gradient.
Daniels' strategy is to extend fair equality of opportunity to healthcare. He
argues that choosing fair equality of opportunity over formal equality of opportunity
in addition to public education requires access to healthcare. Ill health, like
socioeconomic class, is a random circumstance of birth and should not affect one's
ability to realize one's merit.
Jacobs argues that Daniels' approach fails. Differences in health among
individuals do not always reflect arbitrary social circumstances but arbitrary
natural circumstances. Daniels differs from Rawls in his interpretation of fair
equality of opportunity as he requires that it minimize both social and
natural circumstances. According to Jacobs, however, this interpretation is
misguided. The principle of fair equality of opportunity accepts that natural
differences among people are fair. After all, it requires that people have an equal
shot at developing and utilizing their natural talents and ambitions, not that
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everyone have equal natural talents and ambitions. Therefore, Jacobs concludes,
universal access to healthcare is not a requirement of fair equality of opportunity
and the minimalist egalitarian strategy fails.
If one accepts Lesley Jacobs’ objection to Daniels then his indirect approach
fails to deliver universal healthcare. Her objection, however, is no problem for the
direct and indirect approaches which I have argued in favor of. The direct approach
is so named because it is not routed through any broader principle of justice such as
the difference principle. Instead it merely holds that individuals in the original
position would assent to a principle of universal healthcare. In doing so, fair equality
of opportunity never comes into play and thus the direct approach escapes Jacobs’
objection. My indirect approach, though routed through the difference principle,
does not rely on fair equality of opportunity in the way that Daniels’ does. Though it
escapes this objection I still hold that the direct approach is superior as it has the
advantage of simplicity.

1.6: Disability and the Good Life
The notion that good health is necessary for a good life appears problematic
for my view in the case of individuals living with disability. Health seems valuable
because it protects opportunity. Without good health one cannot participate in the
range of opportunities that constitute one’s view of the good life. Disabilities seem
to preclude good health. Generally they are viewed as deviations from health
because they impose limits on one’s physical and mental capacity which causes
worse than average functioning. It may seem implicit in my view that disabled
individuals could not live good lives. Their health prevents them from participating
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in certain activities and experiences which make up the range of opportunities for a
normal human life. Thus, they cannot live a good life. Obviously this conclusion is
false. Most if not all individuals living with a disability would say they enjoy life. My
premise must be reconciled with the empirical evidence in order for the argument
to go through.
Examining the idea of one’s personal conception of the good life clears up
this discrepancy. One’s personal conception of the good life is the manner in which
one would like to live. This includes the activities that one would like to participate
in and the experiences one would like to have. In order for a conception to be
reasonable it must fall within the confines of one’s personal situation. For example,
my desire to breathe underwater is not a legitimate component of my conception of
the good life. So is the case with an individual confined to wheelchair wishing to
walk. While those living with disability can participate in most aspects of society
they are aware that their personal circumstances limit their range of opportunities,
as is the case for all people. Good health is the level of function necessary to live
one’s personal conception of the good life. People with disabilities have different
conceptions of the good life and thus different conceptions of good health.
In this chapter I have argued that by accepting John Rawls’ justice as fairness
account a moral obligation to provide universal access to healthcare arises.
Individuals behind the veil of ignorance value their health too much to risk the ill
effects of the natural and social lotteries. For this reason they would assent to a
principle of justice which requires that their given society provide access to care for
all. Rawls’ difference principle provides two possible indirect approaches to
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universal healthcare. Though both seem like legitimate choices those in the original
position would ultimately assent to one specific principle of justice, the principle of
universal healthcare. This principle of justice would compel certain broad
constraints on the healthcare system necessary for justice. These include access to
minimally decent care for all, access to preventive, therapeutic, and palliative
interventions for all, and some mechanism of rationing. A system of healthcare
which fits this minimal description is just.
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Chapter 2: Nussbaum’s Account of Justice
2.1: The Capabilities Approach
The capabilities approach is an alternative to the contractarian theory of
justice presented by Rawls. In Frontiers of Justice Martha Nussbaum argues that her
theory of justice “can take us further than social contract doctrines” while acting as
an extension of a theory such as Rawls’ (Nussbaum, 69). However, she also believes
that her approach is superior in providing guidance for public policy, an area in
which healthcare is a major concern. In essence the capabilities approach is a list of
the bare minimum human entitlements which all governments should ensure. Put
another way, entitlements are what all humans should be able to do and be.
Enumerating the vital capabilities is accomplished from, “an overlapping consensus
among people who otherwise have very different comprehensive conceptions of the
good” (Nussbaum, 70). Additionally, each capability has a threshold level below
which true human functioning is impossible (Nussbaum, 71). Taken from Frontiers
of Justice, Nussbaum presents the core human capabilities as follows.

1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying
prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be
adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against
violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities
for sexual satisfaction and choice in matters of reproduction.
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think,
and reason – and to do these things in a “truly human” way, a way informed and
cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy
and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and
thought in connection and experiencing and producing works and events of one’s
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own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind in
ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both
political and artistic speech, and freedom or religious exercise. Being able to have
pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain.
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves;
to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love,
to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s
emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. (Supporting this capability
means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in
their development).
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in
critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. (This entails protection for the
liberty of conscience and religious observance.)
7. Affiliation.
A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern
for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be
able to imagine the situation of another. (Protecting this capability means
protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation,
and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.)
B. Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to
be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This
entails provisions of nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual
orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin.
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants,
and the world of nature.
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
10. Control Over One’s Environment.
A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that
govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections of
free speech and association.
B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and
having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek
employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from
unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human
being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships
of mutual recognition with other workers (Nussbaum, 78-80).
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Her account is based upon what she calls the intuitive idea of a life worthy of
human dignity. The list of central human capabilities, she finds, is implicit in the
notion of human dignity (Nussbaum, 70). Such a notion is what requires each
capability to be present in at least a threshold level. In order to flesh out her concept
of human dignity Nussbaum borrows from the Marxian idea of true human
functioning. He stresses the need for human beings to take part in “a totality of
human life activities”. We must have the opportunity for a wide variety of activities
and experiences, not merely receive quantities of resources (Nussbaum, 74).
Nussbaum’s ten capabilities include all human activities which are essential in
Marx’s view. A just society ensures these capabilities for all its members.

2.2: The Capabilities Approach to Universal Healthcare
Universal healthcare seems to be an inevitable consequence of Nussbaum’s
capabilities approach. Like Rawls, it seems she would agree that such a provision is
necessary in order for a society to be just. In Frontiers of Justice she puts forth the
argument that a society is at least minimally just if all its members live lives worthy
of human dignity. From her intuitive idea of human dignity and the Marxian
conception of true human functioning she argues the necessity of ten central human
capabilities. If any of these opportunities for activities and experiences is below a
threshold level then human dignity is not achieved and the society is not just.
Therefore, a just society will ensure these capabilities to at least the minimum level.
How each society attains this level of functioning for all people is up to its own
discretion. In the case of certain capabilities, however, the approach should be more
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clear cut. Healthcare should play a substantial role in at least capabilities one and
two, Life and Bodily Health, and be necessary in some capacity for many others. It
seems inconceivable that a society could achieve threshold levels for capabilities
three (Bodily Integrity), four (Senses, Imagination, and Thought), five (Emotions), six
(Practical Reason), eight (Other Species), nine (Play), and ten (Control Over One’s
Environment) without the availability of healthcare. Of course, healthcare is not
within reach for all members of some societies including the United States. Its cost
can be prohibitive causing some individuals to forgo medical treatment in all but the
most essential cases. In such a society threshold levels for many capabilities will not
be within reach for some people and their lives will not be worthy of human dignity.
By Nussbaum’s account a society like the United States would not be at least
minimally just. In order to be just such a state would need to provide universal
healthcare.
Ensuring many of Nussbaum’s core human capabilities to a threshold level
requires the provision of universal healthcare. Without healthcare a minimum
amount of functioning will not be attained for all but the luckiest individuals. Those
who fall into the majority group and cannot afford adequate healthcare have no
hope of achieving threshold levels of the core human capabilities. It is obvious that
healthcare is vital to protecting capabilities such as Life and Bodily Health though its
necessity for other capabilities may be less apparent. Bodily Integrity requires that
the individual may freely move from place to place. Many treatable medical
conditions prevent this freedom. Infections are usually treatable by standard
medical procedures. Without treatment, however, infection can leave one bedridden
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and incapacitated. Senses, Imagination, and Thought are also part of one’s overall
health. Mental disorders as well as a wide variety of illnesses and injuries, left
untreated, can damage these faculties and limit one’s ability to use and enjoy them.
The Emotions can be similarly affected. Uncertainty and pain due to inadequate
medical care can cause this capability to be unsatisfactorily provided for. Such a
situation can cause “one’s emotional development [to be] blighted by fear and
anxiety” (Nussbaum, 77). A lack of care for mental and physical illnesses precludes
any hope for exercising a minimum level of Practical Reason. Finally, lack of
healthcare prevents full enjoyment of Other Species, Play, and Political Participation.
While universal healthcare is most evidently necessary for Life and Bodily Health its
absence prevents the attainment of a threshold level for almost every one of
Nussbaum’s ten core human capabilities. Healthcare is essential to justice under the
capabilities approach. Ultimately, Martha Nussbaum’s conception of justice provides
a weaker impetus for universal healthcare than Rawls’ approach, justice as fairness.
While the capabilities approach makes a good case it is incomplete in some respects.

2.3: Objections to the Capabilities Approach
No argument should be needed to convince the reader that a just society is
better than an unjust one. Accounts of justice are useful because they provide a
blueprint for how to achieve this essential end. Insofar as this is true, a conception of
justice which does not provide an attainable end is not useful. If the capabilities
approach necessitates universal healthcare then absolute justice will never be
achieved.
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Nussbaum’s approach requires that each of the ten core human capabilities
are provided for to at least a threshold level. For some capabilities this level will be
difficult to define. For others, especially those which most require universal
healthcare, this level is more obvious. The threshold for Life, as Nussbaum describes
it is, “Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying
prematurely” (Nussbaum, 76). The minimum necessary for Bodily Health is similarly
obvious, “Being able to have good health” (Nussbaum, 76). While good health must
be defined it seems possible to reach a consensus of its meaning for each culture or
society. The problem this raises for the capabilities approach comes from the fact
that medicine is inherently imperfect. Some unlucky individuals will never truly
achieve Life or Bodily Health in the Nussbaumian sense. Examples should be
obvious. Consider an infant born with Tay-Sachs disease, a genetic disorder which
generally causes death by the age of four, has no known cure or treatment, and
significantly reduces quality of life. Under the capabilities approach such an infant
will never experience the threshold levels for Life or Bodily Health. A society which
cannot treat Tay-Sachs disease or the many other illnesses which may significantly
harm infants and children is therefore unjust. It seems reasonable to accept that the
capabilities approach necessitates the provision of universal healthcare. If this is the
case, however, justice for all is fundamentally unachievable.
Another significant problem for the capabilities approach arises if it is used
to justify universal healthcare. Worldwide, nations which provide healthcare
generally cover costs associated with abortion. This precedent is problematic for the
capabilities approach. Initially, this procedure seems to clearly violate Nussbaum’s
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first capability, Life. Actually, the problem is much deeper. While capability one
forbids abortion capability three seems to endorse it. Nussbaum’s describes Bodily
Integrity as including, “choice in matters of reproduction” (Nussbaum, 76). Abortion
seems to be a straight forward matter of reproduction. The status of abortion with
respect to justice is ambiguous under the capabilities approach. It serves to show
that capabilities one and three can be in direct contention in certain cases. In order
to keep a consistent conception of justice a society which wishes to use the
capabilities approach as justification for universal healthcare could refuse to cover
abortion. This is at odds with the provisions made by most societies. Women who
would get abortions if not for lack of financial means will bring children into the
world which they cannot provide for.
There are problems associated with both the Rawlsian and Nussbaumian
conceptions of justice. Those that befall the capabilities approach, however, seem to
preclude its usefulness as a conception of justice which can be associated with
universal healthcare. Rawls’ justice as fairness account holds up better for this
purpose and therefore I rest the weight of my moral claim with it. Having settled
upon a conception of justice I now present a series of objections which it must
overcome. The first is the therapy-enhancement distinction.
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Chapter 3: Making the Therapy-Enhancement Distinction
3.1: Defining Therapy and Enhancement
So far I have categorized all medical interventions as falling into three
distinct groups: preventive, therapeutic, and palliative. These procedures, however,
can be classified in two other meaningful groups: therapy and enhancement. It can
be rightfully said that medical care falling under the heading of therapy is necessary
for good health while the same is not true for enhancement. An obvious example is
breast augmentation versus mastectomy. The first surgery is generally considered
enhancement because it has no medical value to the patient. Instead it is performed
optionally with the end goal of improving the subject’s appearance. Removal of
breast tissue, mastectomy, is undergone for the purpose of improving one’s health.
It is a therapy utilized in cases such as breast cancer where allowing the tissue to
remain would prove harmful to the patient. Given a reasonable outlook for survival
any rational person would choose the procedure necessary. Whether one seeks out
and assents to enhancement, however, is much more subjective.

3.2: Therapy Vs. Enhancement In a Rawlsian Society
Any society which provides universal access to healthcare must confront the
therapy-enhancement distinction and the issues that surround it. Such a society
must decide to what extent universal care is provided for its citizens. Would
individuals in the original position want access to plastic surgery or merely the
interventions necessary to stay alive? I believe those in Rawls’ hypothetical
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situation would choose only the latter, recognizing the pitfalls of providing universal
access to enhancements.
Healthcare must be rationed because it consists of scarce resources. Doctors
are highly specialized professionals who require extensive training and are
compensated proportionally. Few members of society have the skill set and
dedication to reach this level and thus those that do are in great demand. Other
medical personnel such as nurses, physicians assistants, and paramedics are skilled
and similarly in demand but have not reached the same pinnacle of expertise.
Medical resources are also hard to come by. This includes facilities like hospitals and
outpatient care as well as the tools of the trade: specialized instruments, donor
blood, and the like. For the most part what sets these limits is money. Healthcare is
undoubtedly important though only a certain proportion of cash can be allocated in
this way whether it comes from public or private funds. No individual or society can
be expected to assign the totality of its monetary resources to healthcare. Thus,
those in the original position must make a choice. It seems all rational individuals in
the original position would assent to principles of justice which provide universal
access to therapy as they value good health. It is less likely, however, that they
would choose principles which ensure access to enhancement. Doing so serves to
dilute the resources allocated to healthcare or divert resources from other
important social programs. This would lower the overall level of health in order to
provide access to procedures which have no effect outside of one’s appearance.
Rational individuals behind the veil of ignorance would not choose to provide
opportunities for enhancement and instead would focus on universal access to
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therapy. The problem then is deciding where therapy ends and enhancement
begins.
3.3: Defining Health and Disease
At its heart, the distinction between therapy and enhancement seems to rest
upon the definition of disease. Breast cancer is a disease and thus mastectomy is a
therapy. Breast augmentation is done by choice, not as a response to disease, and is
therefore an enhancement. Making the distinction, however, is not always simple.
Defining disease is notoriously tricky as problem cases and gray areas which must
be contended with abound. The Oxford English Dictionary calls disease, “a condition
of the body, or of some part or organ of the body, in which its functions are
disturbed or deranged…a departure from a state of health, especially when caused
by structural change” (OED, 441). This definition seems correct based upon the
experience we all have with disease yet it is imprecise. Breast cancer certainly falls
under the category of disease based upon this definition. However, the need for
breast augmentation seems to as well. Consider the reason an individual would seek
this procedure, hope for greater happiness coming from a newfound feeling of selfesteem. It can be debated whether such justification is reasonable though regardless
it seems this is the driving factor in a patient’s desire for such an operation. The
individual’s depression resulting from lack of self-esteem seems to fit the OED
definition of disease as this is a case in which the functions of an organ, the brain,
are disturbed. If when in a healthy state this organ is at least neutral with regard to
emotion then depression seems to constitute a significant departure. By this
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definition of disease breast augmentation could be considered therapy as it treats
depression. The OED definition appears to be inadequate.
Christopher Boorse proposes disease as statistical abnormality in his essay
On the Distinction Between Disease and Illness. This captures the spirit of the OED
definition while adding a new dimension of precision. There is a state of the body
and its organs that the vast majority of people experience. Deviations from this state
are by comparison rare. We consider them diseases because they differ from the
condition of nearly all other people. It is implicit in this idea that the state which the
most people are naturally in is the correct one. Thus they are healthy and those that
are different are diseased. Unfortunately, disease as a statistical abnormality seems
equally problematic.
Boorse argues that statistical abnormality is neither necessary nor sufficient
for disease. The Black Death, which spread through Europe during the 14th century,
afflicted far more than a statistical minority. For Europeans living during this period
the statistical state of health was altered. Few would be inclined to say that the
bubonic plague, the purported cause of the Black Death, was not a disease as it
causes significant harm to one’s body. The prevalence of AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa
stands as another grim example as greater than 15% of all people who inhabit South
Africa are afflicted with this condition. When a specific condition affects such a great
proportion of people it no longer seems to constitute only a statistical abnormality.
Like the bubonic plague it seems incorrect to not classify AIDS as a disease. A more
common example which Boorse provides is tooth decay. It is a deviation from
normal health yet it is something which nearly all people experience (Boorse, 50). If
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this general feeling is upheld in both cases then statistical abnormality is not
necessary for disease. Additionally, such a condition does not seem sufficient to
constitute disease. In the modern era homosexuality is not considered a disease, yet
it is practiced by a statistical minority. Homosexuality does not fit the criteria by
which we usually define disease such as a departure from health. It seems wrong to
classify it as such merely because it is the sexual orientation for a statistical
minority. Deviations from the typical human attributes such as unusual strength or
eye color represent statistical abnormality. As these aberrations are not harmful and
even may be beneficial it seems incorrect to classify them as disease conditions.
Statistical abnormality it then not sufficient for disease (Boorse, 50). Like the OED
definition this conception of disease is irreparably flawed.
As Boorse argues, it may be more useful to define disease from our notion of
health. According to Boorse there are two ideas of health, theoretical health and
practical health. Disease is defined as the opposite of theoretical health. Behind
theoretical health is the notion of normal function in accordance with design. This is
synonymous with the natural state of the being (Boorse, 58). Boorse uses the
example of a car. We would say a car is in good mechanical condition if its function
conforms to what it was designed for. For a given living entity the design or goal
towards which it operates is determined through empirical study (Boorse, 60). For
humans this goal might be reproduction and survival. A human is in good theoretical
health when his or her parts function properly in pursuit of these goals. Disease is
any condition which affects these systems and thereby prevents normal function
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(Boorse, 58). Though this conception of disease seems initially similar to disease as
statistical abnormality, it avoids the pitfalls which disrupt that view.

3.4: Problem Cases
The difficulty in defining disease makes it hard to come up with a clear cut
difference between therapy and enhancement. It seems initially plausible that
therapies treat disease while enhancements do not, yet I have shown that the line is
easily blurred depending upon the definition of disease which one chooses to
employ. This uncertainty in what constitutes a therapy versus an enhancement has
far reaching consequences as the distinction is often called upon to do legal and
ethical work.
Confusion results when two individuals face a similar set of circumstances
which came about differently but require the same treatment. Consider two
abnormally short children, one as the result of a growth hormone deficiency and the
other because of a genetic predisposition towards shortness. Externally their
conditions present in the same way and they will face the same disadvantages in life.
The cause for one child, however, falls under the commonly accepted definition of
disease while for the other it does not. Suppose that both can expect to reach the
height of an average adult human if they receive a regular administration of growth
hormone. While their situations are nearly identical the intervention they receive
cannot be classified as such. For the child who cannot produce enough of his or her
own growth hormone the administration of extra hormone is classified as a therapy.
The other, whose diminutive stature is not the result of a disease condition, instead
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receives enhancement. This divergence in classification is problematic for a society
such as the one I have suggested. The children seem equally entitled to extra growth
hormone. They have the same physical condition which will disadvantage them
similarly without intervention. From an ethical standpoint society seems to have the
same obligation toward both children, however, if we take therapy to constitute
treatment of disease only one child must be provided with additional growth
hormone. In a case such as this few would choose to deny treatment to the second
child on these grounds and thus the ambiguity of the therapy-enhancement
distinction creates a problem for the provision of universal access to healthcare.
Another case in which the therapy-enhancement distinction is invoked is the
prescription of drugs which have a tendency for abuse. Currently marijuana is illegal
in the United States. It can, however, be prescribed by a doctor for various ailments.
For example it is often used for nausea associated with chemotherapy, chronic
physical pain, insomnia, and glaucoma. While studies show that it can be beneficial
as a treatment for a wide variety of ailments it remains illegal because of perceived
negative side effects. Therefore while it can legally be used as a therapy it remains
unlawful to possesses or utilize marijuana for the purpose of “getting high”, an
enhancement. This application of the drug is characterized as such because it
provides no medical value to the user, merely pleasure. Here the distinction
between therapy and enhancement is called upon to do legal work. In order to
determine when and to whom marijuana may be dispensed legally some hard line
must be established. Again the ambiguity of the distinction makes this difficult.
Some idea of the difference between therapy and enhancement can be found though
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it is weakened by the many obvious problem cases which defy classification. It does
not seem we can be confident in legal and ethical decisions which are made based
upon our conception of the distinction. This is highly problematic as any functioning
society, even one without universal healthcare, requires that these cases be
elucidated.
3.5: In Search of a Solution
Neither I nor any other person can offer a perfect solution to this problem. It
is something that all who write on subjects similar to my own must struggle with
and it is not my responsibility to solve it here. The ailments which afflict the human
body are simply too complex to be described by some catch-all categorization. The
same goes for the interventions, either therapies or enhancements, which we utilize
in a medical setting. At best we have a working idea of what makes therapy distinct
from enhancement that can be modified on a case to case basis. Rational individuals
in the original position would undoubtedly know the danger of taking a hard line
stance on what constitutes therapy versus enhancement and then agree to only
provide for the former. We should not hold out hope for a perfect distinction
between therapy and enhancement and instead focus on finding a practical solution
which we can all live with.
Instead of squabbling over the difference between therapy and enhancement
it seems that, in the interest of health, society should focus on when treatment is
truly needed. There are many clear examples of disease which can pointed out such
as AIDS and cancer. Obviously these are cases in which care should unconditionally
be provided. Problem cases must be evaluated on an individual basis. We have a
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moral obligation to provide treatment when necessary. The difficulty in this
approach is deciding which cases require intervention. In the example of the two
abnormally short children I argued that if one receives growth hormone then the
other must as well. Though the second child’s condition does not fit the common
definition of disease he or she will be equally disadvantaged in life. Perhaps
providing growth hormone to this child is enhancement but it still must be covered
because of the moral obligation which society has. As I have pointed out there may
be cases in which breast augmentation should be covered. Even in these cases it may
or may not be rightfully classified as an enhancement. This label is not important.
What counts is whether or not we as a society have a moral obligation to the patient.
If it is determined that this individual’s health, physical or psychological, has been
adversely affected then the intervention must be authorized. Having answered this
objection to the best of my ability I move on to the series of challenges which Robert
Nozick raises for Rawls’ account of justice.
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Chapter 4: Objections From Nozick
4.1: Anarchy, State, and Utopia
Robert Nozick treats part two of Anarchy, State, and Utopia as an answer to
Rawls. He argues that the minimalist state, which he proposes in part one, is the
most extensive state that can be justified (Nozick, 149). Such a state has a few
functions: it protects its participants against violence, theft, and fraud and enforces
contracts (Nozick, 26). The state which Rawls proposes in A Theory of Justice is
distributive. It functions to limit disparities amongst its citizens by facilitating the
redistribution of naturally endowed resources. In doing so distributive justice is
achieved. Nozick’s claim is that any state larger than the minimalist one violates the
rights of its citizens (Nozick, 149). He offers a series of objections to Rawls’
proposed state and the principles of justice that govern it.
To begin, Nozick examines the situation of distributive justice. If all people
are entitled to the things which they hold then the distribution is considered just
(Nozick, 151). The justice of holdings is spelled out in entitlement theory which
itself consists of three principles of justice in holdings. The principle of justice in
acquisition specifies which unheld things may come to be held and how this may
come about. The second is the principle of justice in transfer which details how
something may legitimately change possession from one individual to another
(Nozick, 150). In cases where someone comes to hold something by means which
violate the first two principles the third is invoked. The principle of rectification of
injustice dictates the penalty and reparations for such injustices (Nozick, 152). If all
actions of redistribution occur in accordance with these principles and the initial
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distribution is just, then the new distribution is also just. Entitlement theory differs
from other distributive theories like Rawls’ as it is historical in nature. To know
whether the current holdings and thus the overall distribution is just one must
examine how these holdings came about. Rawls’ theory of justice presents the
opposite, end-state principles. Nozick argues that such principles are inadequate
because they do not take into account what certain individuals may have done in the
past to deserve the distribution they receive (Nozick, 154). He concludes that the
distributive state generated from historical principles such as those of entitlement
theory is superior.
4.2: The Wilt Chamberlain Example
Distributive schemes can also be categorized as patterned and nonpatterned. A patterned principle of distribution arranges distribution according to
some specified natural dimensions (Nozick, 156). For example, there may be a
patterned principle which requires distribution according to moral merit. In such a
case those who have in the past shown the greatest moral merit receive the greatest
share. Rawls’ proposed distributive principles are patterned. Nozick’s principles of
entitlement, however, are not. No set of natural dimensions can generate the
holdings which come about when people act freely yet are bound by the principles
of entitlement (Nozick, 157). Nozick presents his famous Wilt Chamberlain example
in order to show why patterned principles of distribution are not useful.
Imagine patterned distribution D1. Nozick allows this to be the reader’s
favorite distribution. It can distribute all shares equally or distribute according to
some natural dimensions, whichever you prefer. Now consider Wilt Chamberlain, a
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basketball superstar of Nozick’s time who many people would willingly pay to see
play. Chamberlain’s contract dictates that 25 cents from each ticket sold goes
directly to him. His popularity draws many people to watch him play and thus he is
able to amass a wealth which is vastly greater than what he received under D1. This
new distribution can be called D2. According to entitlement theory this distribution
is also just because it was arrived at through the principles of justice in holdings
(Nozick, 161). While this distribution seems to be just it violates the patterned
principle which generated D1. The favored distribution is changed by people acting
in legitimate and just ways. In order to preserve D1 constant redistribution is
necessary. This seems both oppressive and unnecessary as Nozick shows that D2 is
similarly just (Nozick, 163). According to the Wilt Chamberlain example patterned
distributions inevitably fail.
In answering Nozick’s famous problem a Rawlsian can simply stick to his or
her guns. The patterned distribution which I have proposed requires that access to
healthcare be distributed to all people; this is equivalent to D1 in Nozick’s example.
This is necessary because access to care can be cost prohibitive for those who are
poorly endowed. Individuals in the original position for fear of having this situation
in reality would agree to some patterning principle which requires the availability of
healthcare to all. By assenting to such a principle they accept the redistribution
which Nozick fears. Any society will contain some members who utilize their natural
talents in order to gain a greater share of wealth. Nozick is correct that this is just,
however, it is also just to redistribute some of their wealth in order to satisfy the
principles chosen in the original position. The principle of universal healthcare
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requires that this redistribution be made and thus there is no ethical problem with
doing so. For a Libertarian philosopher like Nozick the redistribution of wealth is
unappealing, however, if one accepts the Rawlsian system then the Wilt
Chamberlain example is no problem at all.

4.3: Nozick’s Attack On the Difference Principle
The incentive to participate in social cooperation is that it provides
additional benefits to each individual involved. The task of assigning these benefits
fairly falls on the principles of justice which rational individuals would choose in the
original position. Rawls puts forth two principles of justice, equality in the
assignment of rights and duties and the difference principle. The latter states that
social and economic inequalities are just only if they result in additional benefits for
everyone participating under social cooperation. The major implication of the
difference principle is that the better endowed individuals in a just society can only
flourish if in doing so they benefit the less well endowed. Social cooperation only
becomes a reality if everyone, the better and less well endowed individuals, agree to
participate. Rawls goes on to say that the less well endowed can only be expected to
cooperate if the better endowed propose reasonable terms under which the division
of advantages will occur. He believes that the difference principle satisfies this
criterion and thus the less well advantaged will willingly join in (Rawls, 13).
Nozick chooses to attack the more controversial of Rawls’ two principles of
justice, the difference principle. He reverses Rawls’ assertion and questions whether
under the difference principle the less well endowed could expect the willing
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cooperation of the better endowed. Nozick identifies that the situation of social
cooperation is symmetrical with regard to gains. Both the less well advantaged and
better advantaged gain from such an arrangement (Nozick, 192). What is puzzling,
however, is that the difference principle appears to be asymmetrically biased in
favor of the worse endowed. Its purpose is to provide the worse off with added
advantages while giving nothing extra to those individuals who are more fortunate.
Nozick questions the reason for this asymmetry suspecting the answer lies in how
much each class of individuals stands to gain from social cooperation. To do so he
compares the gains from narrow cooperation and general cooperation. A narrow
cooperative arrangement would involve the better or worse endowed individuals
cooperating amongst themselves but not across these two groups. Nozick imagines
this being possible after some halt in negotiations between individuals in the
original position,
“For failing general agreement on the principles to govern how the benefits
of general social cooperation are to be held, not everyone will remain in a
noncooperative situation if there is some other beneficial cooperative
arrangement involving some, but not all, people, whose participants can
agree” (Nozick, 193).
For example, consider the group of better endowed individuals under the narrow
cooperative arrangement. They will each enjoy social benefits which they would not
living noncooperatively. The same is true for the group of less well endowed
individuals. There is then some measurable social advantage to be gained from
narrow cooperation. Nozick compares this to the gain from general cooperation, the
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arrangement under which all individuals, naturally endowed or not, cooperate.
Again an increase in benefits due to social cooperation occurs because of the larger
pool of individuals. Nozick calls this measure the incremental gain from wider
cooperation. This measure, however, will not be equally felt for individuals coming
from the better and worse endowed narrow cooperative arrangements (Nozick,
193). The group of better endowed individuals obviously have a pool of more
talented people. They have less to gain in joining the others in general cooperation
because the less well endowed have little to offer to them. Thus their incremental
gain from wider cooperation is smaller than it is for those coming from the narrow
arrangement of less well off individuals (Nozick, 194). The better endowed are
already the losers in social cooperation and under the difference principle they
stand to lose even more. With this argument Nozick inverts the situation. Now it
seems the better endowed are the ones positioned to demand that the less well
endowed propose reasonable terms if they want their cooperation. Of course, as
Nozick points out, this is an outrageous request. However, he has shown that the
less well endowed’s initial call for reasonable terms is just as ridiculous and should
not be assented to by the better off. Thus, Rawls has not shown why the burden is
on the better endowed to produce reasonable terms such as the difference principle.

4.4: In Defense of the Difference Principle
The argument which Nozick presents against the difference principle is
successful thought not necessarily compelling. I grant that his objection highlights
an underlying flaw in Rawls’ difference principle. Rawls takes for granted that it is
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the better endowed who must propose reasonable terms in order to ensure
participation by all in social cooperation. As Nozick identifies, the worse endowed
have at least an equal burden and given this situation it seems unlikely that the
better off would agree to a principle which takes more from them. However,
imagining oneself in the original position seems to take away much of the force of
Nozick’s objection. Suppose that the individuals in the original position are aware of
Nozick’s argument though not their own reality as they are behind the veil of
ignorance. They know that if in reality they are worse endowed that they will at
least gain somewhat from cooperating with the better endowed. This is essential to
Nozick’s objection. Such cooperation, however, does not guarantee that they will
have access to social welfare programs like healthcare if they are in fact worse
endowed and need such assistance. Health, as I have previously argued, would be
seen as extremely valuable to those in the original position. Not knowing what sorts
of natural endowments they have in reality these individuals would want to craft
principles of justice which ensure access to healthcare, the best means of
maintaining and achieving good health. The difference principle is one principle of
justice which guarantees the availability of subsidized healthcare. Given the
necessity of healthcare and the importance of the difference principle in achieving it
it seems that a rational individual in the original position would simply bite the
bullet when it comes to Nozick’s objection. He or she knows that if in reality they are
better endowed they will have accepted unreasonable terms in social cooperation
from the worse endowed. Regardless, it seems a rational individual behind the veil
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of ignorance would accept the difference principle anyway as a hedge against being
worse endowed in reality.

4.5: Locke’s Acquisition Theory
The principle of acquisition in holdings is one of three principles of justice
fundamental to Nozick’s entitlement theory, a theory of justice which he presents as
an alternative to Rawls’ justice as fairness account. Under entitlement theory any
distribution which comes about through the principles of justice in holdings from a
previous just distribution is itself just. Nozick’s principles of justice are means by
which property is fairly acquired, transferred, and, in the case of some wrongdoing,
made reparations for. Of the three the principle of acquisition in holdings is the most
problematic for the entitlement theory. The stakes are high for Nozick. Without a
way to fairly acquire unowned resources there can be no just distributions. Any that
arise will be unjust even when in accordance with the other principles of justice in
holdings because the initial distribution is unjust. Nozick bases his principle of
acquisition in holdings on Locke’s theory of acquisition and subsequent proviso.
Locke’s theory states that property rights originate when someone mixes his
or her labor with an unowned object. This assertion seems extremely vague and
Nozick appears to be in agreement as he immediately raises a series of questions for
Locke. For example if an astronaut mixes labor with the soil of an unclaimed planet
does he or she own the land that has been directly touched, the whole planet, the
uninhabited universe, etc (Nozick, 174)? It seems the intuitive idea behind Locke’s
theory is that by mixing something owned (labor) with something unowned one’s
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ownership of the unowned item comes about. Nozick wonders why doing so would
not cause the opposite, the loss of what one owns (Nozick, 175). It seems vital that
Nozick answer these questions in order for his principle of acquisition and thus
entitlement theory to stand. Strangely, he does not and instead proceeds to Locke’s
proviso.
The proviso itself is essential to show how one can be just in any original
acquisition. It is best summarized by Locke; there must be “enough and as good left
in common for others” (Locke, 134). If not, the acquisition is unjust as appropriation
outside of the proviso makes the situation of others worse. Any acquisitions made
according to the proviso are legitimate and just (Nozick, 178). Locke’s proviso is
problematic for a number of reasons

4.6: Objections for the Proviso
The proviso states that one may only appropriate when there is enough and
as good left for others. If a number of people want to appropriate a quantity of
resource then they must divide it equally to satisfy the proviso. Suppose there is
some valuable natural resource which upon division by ten people provides just
enough of a share to each for his or her purposes. Now imagine 1000 people all
laying claim to an identical quantity of resource. By the proviso they will each get an
equal share. However, in this situation dividing the resource by more than ten
generates shares which are inadequate for whatever purpose the people have in
mind. Therefore while the proviso leads to fair acquisition it does so in a manner
which generates useless shares of resource.
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Another problem for Locke’s proviso is the absence of any timeframe for
which it must hold. Neither he nor Nozick specify which generation or generations
enough and as good apply to. Must one only worry about the people of the present
or does enough and as good apply to the needs of future humans as well?
Realistically, it seems impossible to gauge what the people of the future will need. If
they are to be included we must stop all acquisition or risk violating the proviso (of
course they will be unjust in making acquisitions as well for the same reason). If
instead the proviso only applies to the people of the present then Locke and Nozick
seem to make an implicit claim about the people of the future. If the people of the
present do not need to ensure enough and as good for the people of the future then
these future humans seem to have less of a right to the Earth and its resources for
temporal reasons alone. This position being equally unattractive the proviso seems
to fail when a timeframe is introduced.
The terms of the proviso are too vague for it to be useful in adjudication
when people use the same resources for different things. Determining “enough” and
“as good” inevitably necessitates ranking rights to acquisition by reason for
acquisition. Individuals make acquisitions as a means to some end. Every end
requires some amount of resources in order to be brought to completion. We can
only determine what will be enough and as good by knowing what ends some
resource will be used for by the appropriator. Say I want to build a table and you
want to make a ream of paper. In order to do so we each must acquire enough wood
to complete our projects. For example imagine a table requires ten pieces of wood
while a ream of paper requires one. In order to not violate the proviso we must
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leave in common enough wood for the other to complete his or her project.
However, what if the initial supply of wood in common is only ten pieces? Alone, we
can each acquire enough to complete our project but together one of us must violate
the proviso. To be just then we must either mutually agree to scrap both projects or
set about deciding which end is more valuable. It seems fruitless to argue whether a
table or a ream of paper is more valuable and therefore this situation is a problem
for the proviso. Vagueness is also a difficulty for the term “as good”. A knotted piece
of wood makes just as a good a piece of paper as a non-knotted one. In shipbuilding,
however, a knotted board is not as good because it is weaker. This shows that the
same thing can be “as good” or not depending upon its intended use. For this reason
the proviso seems vague when it articulates only that the resources left must be “as
good”. Another challenge becomes apparent if one imagines two sources of wood
situated in different places. Imagine one is a few steps from our shared camp and
the other is only accessible by hiking through miles of swamp. If I appropriate the
grove which is closer at hand and leave you the other have I violated the proviso? It
seems the less accessible resource is not “as good” though the proviso makes no
such distinction. When these objections are taken into account the proviso and
acquisition theory seem insurmountably weak.
The critique of justice as fairness which Nozick advances begins with praise.
His preface shows the deep impact of Rawls’ work in the three years between the
publication of A Theory of Justice and Anarchy, State, and Utopia saying, “Political
philosophers now must work within Rawls’ theory or explain why not” (Nozick,
183). Despite his laudatory remarks Nozick raises many strong objections to Rawls’
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account of justice. He argues that such a theory of distributive justice is unjustifiable
and that a historical, non-patterned theory of justice would be superior. The
alternative which he proposes is entitlement theory. It states that any distribution
which comes about from a previously just distribution through the principles of
justice in holdings is itself just. I have attempted to deflate Nozick’s account by
raising doubts about the legitimacy of one of his principles of justice in holdings, the
principle of acquisition in holdings. Without a principle which dictates how and
when resources may be initially appropriated no just distribution can arise. Without
this principle Nozick’s entitlement theory ultimately fails and cannot be suggested
as a legitimate alternative to Rawls’ account of justice. Nozick utilizes a similar
strategy attacking Rawls’ key principle of justice, the difference principle. In order to
defend this principle I have argued that from behind the veil of ignorance
individuals would still choose the difference principle even if they had knowledge of
Nozick’s objection. The chance that they could be badly endowed in reality is
convincing enough to accept that if they are actually better endowed they will have
taken an unfair deal. The objections which Nozick raises are formidable, however, I
have shown that they generally ill founded and thus not harmful to Rawls’ account.
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Chapter 5: Practical Policy Considerations
5.1 Universal Healthcare Around the World
In presenting my central argument from Rawls’ account of justice and
answering a series of objections I have dealt mainly in abstract philosophy. The
focus of the final section of my thesis is on the practical applications of my
argument. After all, it does no good to conclude that we have a moral obligation to
provide access to healthcare if such a provision is impossible from a pragmatic
standpoint. In this section I will detail the various forms which universal healthcare
takes around the world. I will also explore which system, if any, is favored from the
perspective of those in the original position.
Systems of universal healthcare around the world are as diverse as the
societies from which they arise. The specific history, political environment, and
cultural values of any given nation are inevitably reflected in the nature of its
healthcare system. Data are often cited which correlates universal access to care
with better health outcomes and lower costs. All systems are not created equal,
however, and the statistics commonly cited can be misleading. For example,
healthcare is what economists call a “normal good” meaning that greater wealth
leads to greater healthcare expenditure (Tanner, 2). Additionally, measures of infant
mortality and life expectancy are corrupted by the particular circumstances for any
given country. Legality of abortion causes fewer babies to be born when disease is
detected. War torn nations have lower life expectancies than those with relative
peace (Tanner, 4). In order to appropriately compare systems of universal
healthcare one must look beyond the “headline” data and to the system itself.
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5.2: Three Major Healthcare Schemes
There are three major variants of universal healthcare which roughly
characterize the systems found worldwide: single payer, employment based, and
managed competition. A single payer system is one of the most widely cited as
universal healthcare takes this form in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and
Taiwan. In such an arrangement the government provides healthcare to all people
and collects taxes in order to do so. The government controls the supply of
healthcare and pays providers directly for services rendered. Prices are set for the
providers who are compensated either as salaried government employees or
through reimbursement. The total amount and quality of care distributed is
indirectly determined by whatever budget is set by the government. Depending
upon the nation additional private insurance may be available though in the strictest
single payer systems opting out is impossible.
Germany stands as the model for employment based systems of universal
healthcare. Under this arrangement employers are required to provide healthcare to
their employees. This is done through the formation of insurance or “sickness” funds
either within or across a given industry. The value and nature of premiums and
benefits are often set by the government. Premiums are taken out as a sort of
payroll tax which goes directly to the fund.
The final type of universal healthcare is managed competition. This system
can be seen in Switzerland, Massachusetts, the Netherlands, France, and to some
extent in many other nations. Healthcare which comes in this form tends to vary
from country to country though some defining traits are characteristic. In all cases
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managed competition means universal healthcare which is provided privately in a
heavily government controlled marketplace. This is paired with a government
mandate for all to buy insurance and for employers to provide insurance to all
employees. It is left up to the individual to choose healthcare providers and insurers.
The standard benefits package is set by the government though insurers are allowed
to compete on price and additional benefits. While these are the standard
characteristics of managed competition many variations exist. In order to control
costs and stave off overutilization France and Japan impose significant cost sharing.
In other nations strict limits are set on how much consumers must pay out of
pocket. In some countries it is forbidden to purchase additional or private insurance
while in others this practice is common. Not surprisingly outcomes vary with some
nations marked by cost and low access and others which manage to contain
expenditures and keep lines short (Tanner, 7).
In his study of the global systems of universal healthcare The Grass Is Not
Always Greener: A Look At National Healthcare Systems Around the World Michael
Tanner explores the pros and cons of various systems by nation. He notices that
single payer systems, the most highly touted form of universal healthcare, are
generally problematic. Nations which utilize this arrangement face rising costs,
rationing of care, a lack of modern medical technology, and poor health outcomes.
Instead, he concludes, that any system succeeds only to the degree which it
incorporates various market mechanisms. These include competition, cost sharing,
market prices, consumer choice. The most successful systems also tend to eschew
centralized government control (Tanner, 1).
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5.3: Does Justice as Fairness Favor One System Over Another?
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act signed into law by Barack
Obama draws in part from all three major systems. Its most important feature,
insurance exchanges, are clearly a form of managed competition. Through insurance
exchanges and small business health insurance tax credits businesses that wish to
do so are able to provide healthcare for their employees. This feature is reminiscent
of employment based systems though there is no government mandate requiring
such a provision. Medicare and Medicaid are both examples of single payer systems.
They are essentially insurance providers set up and funded by the government. A
proposed “public option”, a heavily subsidized insurance plan that would be
available in insurance exchanges, serves as a third example. The PPACA seems to
incorporate features used in healthcare systems around the world. Most important,
however, is whether or not it fulfills the conception of justice which I have laid out.
In determining whether or not the healthcare reform to the United States is
just it is useful to first explore what sort of system may be favored by Rawls’ account
of justice. I have argued that individuals in the original position would be hard
pressed to nail down an enduring system of healthcare from behind the veil of
ignorance. The system which best fits a given society is determined by many factors
including history, wealth, resources, population, and cultural values. By the nature
of the veil of ignorance the specifics of the society cannot be known and thus no one
system can be favored. Though the specifics elude them there are a few things which
it seems the participants can universally agree upon. The system must provide at
least an adequate level of care to all members of society regardless of their
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individual situations. Preventive, therapeutic, and palliative care should all be
available based upon some system of rationing which takes into account the given
characteristics and resources of the society. Some distinction between therapy and
enhancement must be made to assist in determining which medical interventions
are necessary and should be covered and which are superfluous and must be paid
for out of pocket. These are the essentials which individuals situated behind the veil
of ignorance would likely agree to.
Given the essential components listed it cannot be argued that justice as
fairness favors one of the broad systems of healthcare mentioned over another.
Managed competition, employment based, single payer, and the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act all seem to adequately cover the necessary bases. Each
system is then applied to a specific society and tweaked further to better suit the
given needs and available resources.
The PPACA is no exception. It strives to address the needs of the people of
the United States in the most efficient and acceptable way possible. For example it
allows for the subsidy of abortion but only in certain “acceptable” cases. The issue of
abortion is extremely contentious in the United States and thus it is a reflection of
the society that federal funds may not go towards elective cases. Of primary
importance is that the PPACA provides the essential features that I have outlined as
being necessary for justice. The PPACA thus fulfills the Rawlsian account of justice.
I have argued that by accepting justice as fairness we are morally obligated to
provide universal access to healthcare. This set up the question of whether or not
the proposed healthcare reform to the United States could stand up to this account

60

of justice and fulfill our moral obligation. Upon examining the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act I have concluded that it provides the components of a
healthcare system which are necessary for justice.
The PPACA was arrived at in a contentious and divisive fashion. Even many
who see the need for universal access to care disagree that it is the correct way of
proceeding. Whether or not it takes the most efficient approach is something I am
content to let the policy makers debate. At the very least I believe we can take pride
in knowing that our system of healthcare fulfills the obligation we have to one
another.
Some readers may be disappointed with these conclusions and find
themselves wanting more. There are, of course, so many thorny issues surrounding
the healthcare debate that one cannot help but wish to unravel. With these unsolved
problems in mind my conclusion may seem relatively modest in its scope. I am
satisfied, however, in that I have answered the questions which have guided me
from the outset. It was my goal to write a thesis that explored our obligation to one
another with respect to healthcare. In the process I wrestled with other large issues
such as determining what makes health and healthcare fundamentally special. This
was all in an effort to gain a new perspective on the debate surrounding the passage
of the Affordable Care Act in the United States. By first answering the larger
underlying philosophical questions it became possible for me to comment more
specifically on this process and its result. Given my arguments I must conclude that
prior to passing the PPACA United States society was unjust. The Obama
administrations law then represents significant moral progress.
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I believe that in this project I have taken the arguments from political
philosophy as far as they can be reasonably expected to go. One cannot hope to gain
the specifics of public policy when arguing from abstract political philosophy. At
best I can offer broad constraints by which we can evaluate the various systems of
healthcare with respect to justice. The details are better left to those with hands on
experience: policy makers, economists, and the like.
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